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CHAPTER 5 
Shifting the Focus? Moral Panics as Civilizing and Decivilizing Processes 
Amanda Rohloff 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Drawing from the work of Norbert Elias and the figurational approach to research, this 
chapter builds on the original concept of moral panic and on the contributions of Alan 
Hunt (2003, 1999, Chapter 4 this volume), Sean Hier (2002a, 2008) and Chas Critcher 
(2009).  My aim is to assess some of the main the assumptions of moral panic research 
and, specifically, to elaborate on the developmental research of Hunt, Hier and Critcher, 
all of whom conceptualize volatile panic episodes in relation to long-term, wider social 
processes.  
I will argue that conceptualizing moral panics as short-term episodes that emerge 
from long-term moralization processes can be enhanced by shifting the focus of moral 
panic research towards the work of Norbert Elias.  I do not argue that we should develop 
a strictly ‘Eliasian’ approach to moral panic at the expense of all the other very important 
work that has been undertaken in this field (most recently, focusing on the work of 
Foucualt, governmentality and moral regulation).  Rather, I highlight how Elias’s work is 
of great value to emerging and more traditional moral panic research. 
It is surprising that the work of Norbert Elias has been little mentioned in the 
same context as moral panic; the ‘figurational approach’ of Elias and, in particular, the 
concepts of civilizing processes, decivilizing processes, and civilizing offensives, have 
much in common with moral panic analyses, albeit there are fundamental differences.  
The first effort to link Elias and moral panic traces to the 1980s with Eric Dunning et al.’s 
work on football hooliganism1.  However, this early work did not attempt to develop a 
synthesis of Elias and moral panic; rather, these figurational studies on football 
hooliganism merely mentioned moral panic in passing, referring to the media’s 
amplification of incidences of football hooliganism and the perceived inappropriate 
reaction by policy makers. 
We can find shadows of Elias in recent work on moral panic, which draws upon 
Alan Hunt’s work on moral regulation (Hunt 1999).  While largely rejecting the concept 
of moral panic, Hunt utilizes both Elias and Foucault to explore historical projects of 
moral regulation (campaigns that others might classify as moral panics).  In his analysis, 
Hunt explores how moral regulatory projects work to both govern others and the self.  
Sean Hier has since taken up Hunt’s analysis and applied it to moral panics, arguing that 
moral panics are volatile episodes that emerge from everyday regulatory projects, where 
the focus shifts from ethical self governance to the governance of ‘dangerous’ others 
(Hier, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2008).  Chas Critcher (2008, 2009) has also joined the debate, 
albeit with some disagreement as to the extent to which we can apply the concept of 
moral regulation to moral panic.  
The chapter focuses on utilizing Elias’s concepts of civilizing processes, 
decivilizing processes, and civilizing offensives, in combination with the figurational 
approach to research, to facilitate several shifts in the focus for moral panic research.  
Elias’s approach to research, along with the concepts he developed, enables us to explore 
panics in relation to long-term and short-term processes and to explore the contradictory, 
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countervailing processes that occur before, during and after panics.  This is important 
because previous moral panic studies, bar a few exceptions, have tended to focus on what 
happens during a panic, and the impact a panic may have, while neglecting the 
antecedents to the panic (see Critcher 2003: 26; Rohloff and Wright 2010). 
I begin by providing a brief overview of Elias’s theory of civilizing and 
decivilizing processes, before critically discussing the possibility of conceptualizing 
moral panics as decivilizing processes.  In response to the limitations of a narrow 
conceptualization of moral panics as decivilizing processes (which, I argue, can only be 
applied to some ‘classical’ moral panic cases), I discuss a dialectical understanding of 
(de)civilization.  Here, I introduce the concept of civilizing offensive, which may involve 
a fusion of both civilizing and decivilizing trends, as a useful conceptual tool to move 
beyond a normative dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ moral panic, and instead to further 
explore the complex, paradoxical, ambivalent processes that may occur before, during 
and after moral panics.  I then compare Elias’s ‘figurational approach’ to moral panic 
research, not only fleshing out some of the commonalities between the areas of research, 
but also highlighting what a figurational approach can add to moral panic research.  
Specifically, I argue that the concept of ‘involvement-detachment’ and of ‘secondary 
involvement’ facilitate establishing a mode of research that does not entail a normative, 
debunking presupposition that the reaction (or panic) is inappropriate (although research 
can still be informative in this regard, as will be discussed later).   Elias’s approach to 
research focuses on historical and comparative research; applying his ideas to moral 
panic research encourages us to comparatively explore empirical examples that do not fit 
the ‘classic’ model of a moral panic, which forces us to question many of the assumptions 
about moral panic, including the normative presupposition. I conclude by using the 
example of climate change to illustrate several points made throughout the chapter, 
including how moral panics can be conceived as both civilizing and decivilizing 
processes (considering both long-term and short-term processes), and how moral panics 
can be conceived as civilizing offensives – attempts to ‘civilize’ the ‘self’ and/or the 
‘other’ – in a time of perceived crisis. 
 
CIVILIZING PROCESSES 
 
In The Civilizing Process (2000), Elias explored ‘civilization’ in two very different ways.  
Firstly, he explored the development of the normative concept of ‘civilization’: the 
process whereby one group of people come to see themselves as more ‘civilized’ than 
another group of people, thereby enabling these self-identified ‘civilized’ people to 
commit acts that at other times would be seen as ‘uncivilized’ (indeed, the first part of his 
book is devoted to the ‘sociogenesis’, or development, of the normative concepts of 
‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ in everyday language).  While Elias did not want to use the 
term ‘civilizing process’ to refer to progress, he did seek to understand how the concept 
of ‘civilization’ in its everyday usage had attained these connotations of ‘progress’ and 
‘self-betterment’ (as opposed to the ‘uncivilized’, and the ‘barbaric’).2 
In contrast to the normative, everyday understanding of ‘civilization’, Elias 
sought to develop a second, more technical and sociological understanding of 
‘civilization’.  In his examination of Western Europe from the Middle Ages, Elias 
developed his ‘central theory’ (Quilley and Loyal 2005) of civilizing processes by 
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empirically exploring the interrelationship between long-term changes in standards of 
behaviour and long-term changes in state-formation and other wider processes. 
Following on from the first part of The Civilizing Process, ‘On the sociogenesis of 
the concepts of “civilization” and “culture”’, Elias explored how the development of the 
concept of ‘civility’ played out in notions of what constituted ‘civilized’ behaviour.  He 
explored these changes in standards of behaviour by analysing etiquette books and other 
documents, beginning with Erasmus’s 1530 publication, ‘On Civility in Boys’.  
Throughout his analysis of these etiquette books, Elias traced an overall pattern of 
gradual changes in standards of behaviour relating to everyday interactions (e.g., 
behaviour at the table, blowing one’s nose, toileting practices).  These books illustrated, 
for Elias, behaviour that was deemed to be acceptable, or ‘civilized’, as well as behaviour 
that was seen as unacceptable, or ‘uncivilized’.  Elias observed that, over time, certain 
behaviours that were seen to be more ‘animalistic’ (such as bodily functions) came to be 
associated with shame and disgust and were increasingly ‘shifted behind the scenes’.  At 
the same time, the regulation of these and other behaviours came increasingly to be 
regulated by self-control rather than external force.  This is what Elias calls the social 
constraint towards self-constraint. 
In relation to state-formation and other wider social processes, Elias traces how 
competition between various groups of people, with associated conflict between these 
groups, culminated in the establishment of a monopoly of one group and the eventual 
formation of a state.  This process of state-formation brought with it changes in the way 
people were connected with one another, leading eventually to greater integration and 
greater interdependence between people, which brings with it changes in relations 
between them.  As Elias puts it, as people become more reliant upon one another via 
increasing differentiation and increasing interdependence, 
 
…more and more people must attune their conduct to that of others, the web of 
actions must be organized more and more strictly and accurately, if each individual 
action is to fulfill its social functions.  Individuals are compelled to regulate their 
conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable manner (Elias 
2000: 367). 
 
This process, Elias argued, is in part dependent upon a gradual stabilization of a central 
state authority, with an associated state monopolization over the forces of violence and 
taxation.  These processes, Elias argued, contribute towards a notion of stability, where 
dangers come to be perceived as fewer and, when they occur, as more predictable (that is, 
where dangers are known, and so life becomes less uncertain).  Elias offers the example 
of ‘When a monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are 
normally free from violence’ (Elias 2000: 369).  When violence does occur, it is often 
either hidden ‘behind the scenes’ or legitimated in some way by the state. 
To summarize, Elias’s theory of civilizing processes holds that, as a central state 
authority grows and gains increasing monopolization over the control of violence and 
taxation, people come to be increasingly integrated and interdependent with one another.  
These changes in wider social processes exert pressures towards changes in behaviour, 
compelling people towards increasing foresight, mutual identification and increased self-
restraint, thus contributing to more even, stable behaviours and relations between people.  
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In later works, Elias examined how these changes were intertwined with gradual changes 
in modes of knowledge, from ‘magico-mythical’ knowledge towards increasingly 
‘reality-congruent’ knowledge3 (Elias 2007).  
 
Decivilizing processes 
 
It is important to note that Elias did not regard his theory of civilizing processes as 
unilinear or inevitable; it was neither a theory of ‘progress’ nor a proclamation of the 
superiority of Western ‘civilization’ (Kilminster & Mennell, 2008, p. xiii).  Indeed, Elias 
observed that the process of civilization is ‘in a continuous conflict with countervailing 
decivilising processes.  There is no basis for assuming that it must remain dominant’ 
(Elias 2008:4). 
Building on Elias’s work, Stephen Mennell has developed some ‘possible symptoms 
of decivilizing.’  Put simply, ‘Decivilizing processes are what happens when civilizing 
processes go into reverse’ (Mennell 1990: 205) (see also Fletcher 1997).  One of the 
potential ‘reversals’ that Mennell elaborates on is ‘a rise in the level of danger and a fall 
in its calculability’ (Mennell 1990: 215).  As Elias argued, 
 
The armour of civilized conduct would crumble very rapidly if, through a change in 
society, the degree of insecurity that existed earlier were to break in upon us again, 
and if danger became as incalculable as it once was.  Corresponding fears would 
soon burst the limits set to them today (Elias 2000: 532). 
 
In other words, as danger becomes increasingly incalculable, so too people’s behaviour 
changes accordingly—it is perhaps more conducive for your survival if, where there is a 
great deal of uncertainty surrounding potential danger, you tend to err on the side of 
caution in relations with the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’ world (for example, the ‘fight or 
flight’ response). 
Stephen Mennell observes that there often exists the perception today that we are 
living in a more violent world.  He refers to Geoffrey Pearson’s historical study that 
illustrates the periodic commonality of such ‘fears of escalating violence, moral decline, 
and the destruction of “the British way of life”’ (Mennell 1990: 214).  Here, Mennell 
critiques the idea that this qualifies as a decivilizing process, stressing that an actual 
increase in violence may not necessarily be occurring (aside from periodic short-term 
increases).  But perhaps merely the perception of an increase in violence may affect the 
development of other decivilizing trends, as may be the case with some moral panics. 
Another possible symptom of decivilizing processes that Mennell suggests relates to 
‘changes in modes of knowledge’: 
 
During times of social crisis – military defeats, political revolutions, rampant 
inflation, soaring unemployment, separately or in combination – fears rise because 
control of social events has declined.  Rising fears make it still more difficult to 
control events.  That makes people still more susceptible to wish fantasies about 
means of alleviating the situation (Mennell 1990: 216). 
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In other words, there occurs a shift back from ‘reality congruent’ to increasingly ‘magico-
mythical’ knowledge.  
These changes may then potentially coincide with changes in behaviour, where 
certain acts that were formerly seen as ‘uncivilized’ or ‘barbaric’ become increasingly 
more acceptable, where there may occur a shift away from violence ‘behind the scenes’ 
back to the reemergence of violence in the public sphere, where mutual identification 
between people (or particular groups of people) decreases (Mennell 1990).  A classic 
example of this is Elias’s own study of Nazi Germany (Elias 1996).  Although, as 
Mennell observes, these decivilizing trends were only partial reversals: the extermination 
of the Jews still had to be kept ‘behind the scenes’ to a certain extent, suggesting that 
there was still a degree of mutual identification with the Jews (Mennell 1990). 
 
Moral panics as decivilizing processes? 
 
As already mentioned, decivilizing processes may occur where there is a weakening of 
the state, for example, in the aftermath of social or natural crises.  However, with moral 
panics, there need not be an actual weakening, only a perceived weakening.  This could 
include the perception that governmental regulations, and the enforcement of those 
regulations, are failing to control a particular perceived problem; or, conversely, that 
individuals are failing to regulate their own behaviour and therefore there is a need for a 
stronger external force (from either within or outside ‘the state’4) to ‘control’ these 
‘uncontrollable’ deviants. 
A further indicator of decivilizing processes is the increase in the level of danger 
posed, as well as an increasing incalculability of danger; that is, where danger becomes 
more prominent and increasingly difficult to predict.  In the case of moral panics, it could 
be argued that the ‘exaggeration and distortion’ of reporting on phenomena (reporting of 
both past events and potential future risks) have contributed to a sense that we now live in 
an increasingly dangerous society, where the occurrence of dangers is perceived to be 
difficult to predict. 
In addition to Mennell’s symptoms of decivilizing, Jonathan Fletcher (1997: 83) 
has proposed three main criteria for decivilizing processes: (1) a shift from self-restraint 
to social constraint (i.e. governance of the other, rather than self-governance); (2) a shift 
towards ‘less even’, ‘less stable’ patterns of behaviour (i.e. where people’s behaviour 
flucutuates in different situations and with different people, to the point where people’s 
behaviour, and responses to others, becomes increasingly unpredictable); and (3) ‘a 
contraction in the scope of mutual identification’, where people come to identify and 
empathise with an increasingly smaller group of people.  Fletcher goes on to say that 
these three main criteria ‘would be likely to occur in societies in which there was a 
decrease in the (state) control of the monopoly of violence, a fragmentation of social ties 
and a shortening of chains of commercial, emotional and cognitive interdependence’ 
(Fletcher 1997: 84).  He further adds that these societies would likely be characteristic of 
Mennell’s symptoms of decivilizing (as outlined above).  
Rather than regarding moral panics as a complete decivilizing process, we can see 
how perceived increase in danger, and/or perceived failure of central state authority to 
protect its citizens from perceived dangers, may be enough to bring about partial 
decivilizing processes, similar to those outlined above.  If a particular issue (danger or 
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threat) becomes highlighted and mass communicated (for example, via the media), fears 
may increase and danger may come to be perceived as increasingly incalculable with 
regard to the given issue.  In turn, ‘folk devils’ may be created. During this process, folk 
devils may come to be increasingly dehumanized and come to be seen as the dangerous 
‘uncivilized’ other, thereby enabling the use of more ‘cruel’ measures that would, under 
other conditions, be deemed ‘uncivilized’.  In the haste to address the given issue, 
solutions may be proposed that are not necessarily well informed, and may not function 
adequately to address the given issue; indeed, they may have the unintended consequence 
of contributing to the problem.  In addition, in attempts to alleviate the perceived 
problem, the state, or even citizens themselves, may draw upon more violent, 
‘uncivilized’ measures in an attempt to try and contain the problem; for example, the 
development of new laws that may override certain civil liberties, or the development of 
vigilantism (Rohloff 2008). 
However, while the above may apply to some cases that have been classified as 
moral panics, I wish to argue that it not simply the case that all moral panics are merely 
decivilizing processes.  Indeed, as Elias himself would no doubt have argued, civilizing 
and decivilizing processes (and thereby, moral panics), are much more complex than this.  
Potentially, civilizing processes may contribute to the emergence of moral panics, and 
moral panics may, in turn, feed back into civilizing processes.  It is here that we need a 
shift in the focus of moral panic research in order to attend to the complexity of moral 
panics. 
 
CIVILIZING OFFENSIVES: TOWARDS A DIALECTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
(DE)CIVILIZATION 
 
In his discussion of the complexity of civilizing and decivilizing processes, Robert van 
Krieken (1998, 1999) draws upon the concept of ‘civilizing offensives’ (a concept 
derived from the work of Elias; see Mitzman 1987).  Civilizing offensives have been 
defined as ‘deliberate (but not necessarily successful) attempts by people who consider 
themselves to be “civilized” to “improve” the manners and morals of people whom they 
considered to be “less civilized” or “barbaric”’ (Dunning and Sheard 2005: 280).  In this 
way, ‘civilizing offensives’ bear a strong resemblance to those moral regulation 
campaigns that are analyzed by Alan Hunt in Governing Morals (Hunt 1999), which, in 
turn, bear some resemblances to what others have termed ‘moral panics’ (as well as 
processes that Howard Becker (1991) earlier termed ‘moral crusades’ by ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’). 
Robert van Krieken argues ‘for a more dialectical understanding of social 
relations and historical development, one which grasps the often contradictory character 
of social life’ (van Krieken 1998:132).  Here, van Krieken is arguing that processes of 
civilization themselves can give rise to decivilizing trends in the form of ‘civilized 
barbarism’.  To illustrate this point, he draws upon the example of the ‘stolen 
generations’ in Australia.  In their project to ‘civilize’ indigenous Australian children, 
Europeans forcibly removed the aboriginal children from their homes and families in an 
attempt to make the aboriginal children more like European children (i.e., to ‘civilize’ 
them).  This project took the form of a ‘civilizing offensive’, and was carried out in the 
name of civilization.  Civilizing processes were present, with the exception that mutual 
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identification was limited between Europeans and the indigenous population.  However, 
there was still a degree of mutual identification; the ‘stolen generations’ were integrated 
amongst the Europeans, rather than obliterated (although other aborigines were killed), 
and it is important to highlight that this civilizing offensive was carried out in 
philanthropic terms as an attempt to improve (as they saw it) the lives of the aboriginals 
(van Krieken 1999). 
Therefore, while ‘civilizing offensives’ can be compared with projects of moral 
regulation (and, by extension, episodes of moral panic), they may involve within them a 
fusion of civilizing and decivilizing trends.  If we combine this idea of a civilizing 
offensive involving a fusion of civilizing and decivilizing trends, and then apply it to the 
concept of moral panic, we can use this to develop a more encompassing concept of 
moral panic, one that takes account of the complex (civilizing and decivilizing) processes 
that intertwine before, during and after a moral panic, thereby overcoming the 
dichotomous, normative conceptualization of moral panics as being either ‘bad’ or 
‘good’ panics.5  One potential way to overcome this normative dichotomy is by 
integrating some of the aspects of figurational research with moral panic research. 
 
MORAL PANIC AND FIGURATIONAL RESEARCH 
 
A figurational (or process) approach to research is derived from Elias’s own approach to 
research, most explicitly outlined in What is Sociology? (Elias 1978), as well as 
numerous articles and other publications (for example, see Elias 1956, 1987).  Rather 
than giving an exposition about a figurational approach6, I flesh out some of the core 
assumptions of the approach by comparing figurational research with moral panic 
research. 
 
Commonalities 
 
There are already many commonalities between figurational research and the concept of 
moral panic.  Both moral panic and figurational research are processual, in that they both 
seek to ask questions about the processes by which something has come to pass.  For 
example, Elias explored how some people came to see themselves as more ‘civilized’ 
than others (Elias 2000).  With moral panic research, a ‘processual model’ (Critcher 
2003) is used to explore how a particular reaction to a perceived social problem has 
developed. 
The figurational approach and moral panic research also focus on relations.  The 
foundations of moral panic within symbolic interactionism and labeling theory have 
ingrained the concept with a focus on relations between people, including changing 
power relations between the ‘control culture’ and the ‘folk devils’ (Ben-Yehuda 2009).   
Epistemologically, moral panic research sees ‘social reality’ as constantly in flux – 
continually contested and forever changing as relations between people change.  This is 
similar to how Elias conceptualizes ‘social reality’.  Elias was very critical of the notion 
that one could discover eternal laws about social relations – static laws that are similar to 
those in the physical sciences.  Thinking in terms of processes, relations, and 
development, Elias did not regard the ‘nature’ of ‘social reality’ as static and unchanging; 
rather he saw it as a continual process of development, resultant from the complex 
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interactions between interdependent players (be they humans, other animals, etc.) (for 
example, see Elias 1978). 
As we have already seen, via the concepts of civilizing processes, deciviliizing 
processes, and civilizing offensives, moral panic and figurational research also share an 
interest in exploring changes in the regulation of behaviour – both regulation of the self 
and regulation of the other.  However, there are several existing points of departure.  
Rather than viewing these differences in research approaches as problems, I now wish to 
discuss how these points of departure can be utilised to further develop moral panic 
research and to attend to some of the recent criticisms and debates surrounding moral 
panic. 
 
Points of Departure: Involvement, Detachment and the ‘Political Project’ 
 
An important inclusion that figurational research can bring to moral panic research is via 
the concept of ‘involvement-detachment’.  Recent debates in the moral panic literature 
have discussed normativity and the ‘political project’ of moral panic research.  On the 
one hand, the concept of moral panic, as first developed by Stan Cohen, Jock Young, and 
others, entailed within in it several assumptions about the purpose and focus of moral 
panic research7.  As Cohen himself observes: 
 
It is obviously true that the uses of the [moral panic] concept to expose 
disproportionality and exaggeration have come from within a left liberal consensus.  
The empirical project is concentrated on (if not reserved for) cases where the moral 
outrage appears driven by conservative or reactionary forces…the point [of moral 
panic research] was to expose social reaction not just as over-reaction in some 
quantitative sense, but first, as tendentious (that is, slanted in a particular ideological 
direction) and second, as misplaced or displaced (that is, aimed – whether 
deliberately or thoughtlessly – at a target which was not the ‘real’ problem) (Cohen 
2002: xxxi). 
 
There thus exists an assumption (or presupposition) that, with moral panic research, the 
reaction to a perceived social problem under investigation is somehow inappropriate and, 
therefore, wrong.  To be sure, some moral panic studies have consisted of analyses of 
reactions to imagined social problems (for example, ‘satanic ritual abuse’).  However, to 
have a concept, and a mode of research, that carries with it a debunking presupposition is 
limited in what it may achieve. 
In response to the problem of normativity, as well as other problems, several 
authors have either rejected the concept altogether, or have begun to develop a 
reconceptualization that attempts to overcome this normative assumption (and other 
limitations) (Hier 2008).  However, the attempt to remove the ‘political’ aspect of moral 
panic, informed in part by Foucault, has come with some criticism from others (see 
Critcher 2008, 2009).  It seems that there exists a tension between those who want the 
concept to retain its political project and those who want to develop a more detached 
approach to moral panic research. 
One way to overcome this apparent divide is through the application of the 
figurational concept of ‘involvement-detachment’ (Elias 2007).  Elias was very critical of 
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the intrusion of ‘heteronomous valuations’ into research, and endeavoured to develop 
sociology into a relatively autonomous ‘science’ (Elias 1978).  Normative ideological 
intrusions, such as those outlined earlier, could be construed as a type of heteronomous 
valuation where the researcher’s identification with a particular group (in this case, the 
‘deviants’), combined with a political project to ‘liberate’ the particular group, may 
influence the degree to which the researcher can step back and see the development of, in 
this case, a ‘moral panic’, as being more than a short-term irrational aberration. 
This does not mean that Elias advocated a ‘value neutral’ sociology, which he 
would have regarded as an impossible and undesirable task. One can never be completely 
involved or completely detached. Sociology consists of the study of relations between 
interdependent people and a degree of involvement was desirable in order to aid our 
understanding of human relations.  While an initial ‘involvement’ in something may 
spark interest to investigate that particular topic, Elias argued that this initial involvement 
should be accompanied by an attempt at ‘stepping back’ through a ‘detour via 
detachment’.  The idea being that one can contribute to a more ‘reality congruent’ 
knowledge if one is not too constrained by the short-term aim of achieving some political 
goal (Elias 1978, 2007).  If we then apply this to moral panic research, it would mean that 
when undertaking a ‘moral panic study’, we would endeavour not to have a prior 
judgment about what we might find (in terms of the ‘appropriateness’ of reactions to 
perceived social problems), nor would it involve any overtly political aim; if a ‘political 
project’ were to occur, it would come after the research, with the intention of lessening 
one’s own biases intruding upon the research (Rohloff and Wright 2010).  In this way, 
the concept of ‘involvement-detachment’, while at first glance appears to be incompatible 
with moral panic research, may indeed be one way to further develop the concept of 
moral panic and overcome the normative divide. 
 
The problem of a normative presupposition 
 
While there is nothing wrong with some moral panic research leading to the debunking of 
claims, it should not be imbued within the concept as a fixed criterion.  Otherwise, one 
runs the risk of having the concept of moral panic determining what the researcher will 
find.  The concept then becomes useless, as it can then only be applied following 
research, rather than used as a guiding principle; it also limits the applicability of the 
concept.  As an illustrative example of this normative presupposition, I recently received 
reviewers’ comments on a manuscript that I had under consideration.  The article was on 
climate change, moral panic and civilization.  Despite the fact that I clearly outlined in 
my paper that I was reconceptualizing moral panic, and was not using it in a debunking 
capacity, the normative debunking connotations associated with ‘moral panic’ were ever 
present in the reviewer’s mind, leading them to call me a ‘climate change skeptic’ and 
calling my paper a piece of ‘climate change denial’.  While some may disagree with my 
application of moral panic to climate change (for various reasons), these comments 
served to illustrate for me that the concept of moral panic is highly imbued with 
connotations of irrationality and debunking at the outset.  Therefore, this reaffirms the 
necessity for a shift in focus in moral panic research towards an approach that does not 
entail such a normative presupposition (while still retaining the potential for a ‘critical’, 
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informative reflection post-analysis), including examination of issues that do not fit the 
‘classic’ moral panic model. 
 
Dichotomous Thinking 
 
An additional way that figurational research differs from much moral panic research is in 
its attempts to move beyond dichotomous thinking.  Another recent debate within moral 
panic literature has been concerned with the issue of moral panic versus risk society, or 
moralized social problems versus concerns over ‘natural’ issues (such as health, the 
environment).  Some authors have argued that ‘moral’ is somehow seen as a separate 
sphere.  For example, Kenneth Thompson argues, ‘Sometimes panics about food (e.g., 
the BSE scare about infected beef) or health have been confused with panics that relate 
directly to morals’ (Thompson 1998: vii).  Such arguments seem to suggest that ‘panics 
about food’ cannot contain a moral element (a view echoed by Cohen and Critcher); it is 
a question of moral panics versus risk panics (Ungar 2001).  However, others such as 
Hunt and Hier, disagree, arguing that risks can be moralized and that moral panics 
themselves involve risk discourses.  A question for exploration could be why are some 
moral panic researchers so intent on limiting the applicability of the concept?  Can this 
perhaps tell us something about the function of the concept for sociologist, and the 
motivations behind (some) moral panic research?  Perhaps a further shift in focus could 
be on the sociology of the sociology of moral panic?  
 
Short-Term Campaigns and Long-Term Processes 
 
One way that moral panic research and figurational research can further develop one 
another is via a fusion of the two.  As it currently stands, moral panic research tends to 
focus on short-term processes, to the relative neglect of how long-term processes relate to 
short-term episodes of moral panics (Rohloff and Wright 2010)8.  When the time-frame 
for research is extended, it is often on the aftermath of the panic, not on the antecedents 
that fed into the panic (Critcher 2003).  A focus on the short-term also implies a sort of 
‘epistemic rupture’ that constitutes a revolutionary change in the way (some) people may 
perceive a particular social problem.  In some instances, this short-term focus has also 
placed greater emphasis on the intentional actions of crusading reformers, to the relative 
neglect of more long-term unplanned developments that may influence the development 
of a moral panic. 
Conversely, figurational research has been criticized for its relative neglect of 
deliberate intentional campaigns, such as civilizing offensives.  Such a criticisim may 
perhaps be unjust, for Elias conceptualized social development as being a combination of 
intended and unintended developments: 
 
…the interweaving of the planned acts of many people results in the development 
of the social units which they form with each other, unplanned by any of the 
people who brought them about.  But the people who are thus bonded to each 
other constantly act intentionally, and purposefully from within the course of 
developments which they have not planned, and with results that feed back into 
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the unplanned course of development….a dialectical movement between 
intentional and unintentional social changes  (Elias 1998: 204). 
 
Nevertheless, the concept of civilizing offensives has received comparatively less 
attention than that of more long-term unplanned developments associated with civilizing 
(and decivilizing) processes (Dunning and Sheard 2005: 280).  Yet, within a figurational 
approach, conceptually there exists the possibility to explore the relation between short-
term intentional campaigns and more long-term wider social processes – moral panic 
research may be one way to pursue such an exploration. 
 
MORAL PANICS AS CIVILIZING AND DECIVILIZING PROCESSES: BEYOND 
THE NORMATIVE DIVIDE 
 
What, then, would a figurational approach to moral panic research look like?  And how 
can moral panics be conceptualized as both civilizing and decivilizing processes and 
what would such a conceptualization mean? 
A figurational approach to moral panic research might involve exploring the 
interplay between long-term regulatory processes (moral regulation, or civilizing and 
decivilizing processes) and short-term campaigns (moral panics).  This could involve the 
study of how various processes have been gradually developing in the long-term, 
including changes in standards of behaviour, changes in the communication of 
knowledge, changes in state-formation, changes in social and self-regulation, changing 
power relations between people.  This could then be combined with an exploration of 
various short-term campaigns (instances of moral panics), and how these short-term 
campaigns relate to the more gradual wider social processes.  Such a focus on long-term 
developmental research could then provide us with a greater insight into the complex, 
dialectical processes that develop in relation to moral panics. 
As an example, consider the topic of climate change.  There has already been 
some figurational research that has argued that the development of ecological sensibilities 
could be seen as a type of civilizing process (Quilley 2009; Schmidt 1993).  Moral panic 
research has also been undertaken on the topic of global warming, where, it is argued that 
global warming campaigns constitute ‘social scares’ (a concept derived from moral 
panics) (Ungar 1992, 1995).  One could also argue, perhaps, that certain outcomes of 
processes of civilization have given rise to decivilizing consequences, in the form of 
excess capitalism and overconsumption, to the relative detriment of the environment and 
social life as a whole (see also Ampudia de Haro 2008).  Potentially, campaigns 
surrounding climate change could be utilized as civilizing offensives, or moral panics, to 
bring about a civilizing ‘spurt’.  However, these campaigns could also, potentially, bring 
with them decivilizing disintegrative processes; for example, via the development of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people (this is already happening, to a 
certain extent, with some animal rights and environmental activists who prioritize 
animal/environmental rights over the rights of ‘other un-eco-friendly’ people; where 
increasing mutual identification with other animals and the environment, goes hand-in-
hand with decreasing mutual identification with other people) (for example, see Quilley 
2009: 133).  So, potentially, moral panics over climate change could be regarded as both 
civilizing and decivilizing processes. 
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Moral panics are highly complex processes.  To further tap into the complexity of 
moral panics, it is necessary to abandon some of the former dichotomous thinking 
regarding moral panics, as it limits our perception about what moral panics might be and 
what they might entail.  Such dichotomies include: moral/risk, rational/irrational, 
‘good’/’bad’, and civilizing/decivilizing.  Through collapsing these dichotomies, and 
expanding the scope of moral panic research to other types of examples, as well as longer 
time frames of analysis, we can gain a greater insight into how moral panics develop and 
how they relate to more long-term processes. 
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NOTES !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For example, see: Dunning, Murphy & Williams (1986, 1988); Dunning & Sheard 
(2005); Murphy, Dunning & Williams (1988); Murphy, Williams & Dunning (1990). 
2 For introductions to Elias’s work, see: Dunning & Hughes (forthcoming); Fletcher 
(1997); Hughes (2008); Kilminster (2007); Mennell (1998); van Krieken
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(!O23!9@3-6?3!C./;@//.25!29!-6?!/2;.2827=!29!-6?!/2;.2827=!29!02348!145.;D!/??!X43845C!L#++)N!45C!Y268299!V!T3.76-!L#+"+NH!)!Although some authors, such as Hunt, Hier, and now Critcher, are beginning to address 
this neglect of the relationship between short-term campaigns and long-term processes 
via a fusion, of sorts, of moral panic with moral regulation; exploring the relationship 
between short-term regulatory episodes (i.e. panics) and more long-term projects of 
moral regulation.!
